CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Amrit Yadav v. The State of Jharkhand And Ors., 2025
The Supreme Court declared the 2010 recruitment process for Class-IV employees by the Jharkhand government illegal and unconstitutional. The Court found that the process violated Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, as it failed to mention the number of posts, did not specify applicable reservation, and changed the selection process mid-way by including an interview round that was not initially mentioned in the advertisement. As a result, the Court quashed the entire recruitment process and directed the state to issue fresh advertisements for the positions within six months.
The Court further upheld the termination of several candidates by the Jharkhand High Court, who had been appointed through the unconstitutional process. The Court emphasized that appointments made through an unconstitutional process cannot be protected, even if the candidates had worked for years and were not heard before their appointments were canceled.
In this context, the Court referenced Union of India v. Raghuwar Pal Singh (2018) 15 SCC 463, stating that if an appointment process is a nullity, the principles of natural justice do not need to be followed, as it would be a futile exercise. It was also clarified that appointments resulting from an unconstitutional process can be set aside, even if the person has already joined the service.
The Court highlighted that the State cannot act arbitrarily in public appointments, as public employment is a constitutional duty and must be carried out in a fair, transparent, and impartial manner. Arbitrariness in public employment goes against the fundamental right to equality under Article 14. Therefore, the recruitment process must comply with the Constitution, ensuring fairness and equality for all citizens.
M.S. Sanjay v. Indian Bank & Ors., 2025
In a recent judgment, the Supreme Court reiterated that the writ court does not interfere in cases of mere statutory violations unless they have caused substantial injustice. Referring to the case of Shiv Shanker Dal Mills v. State of Haryana (1980), the Court emphasized that, legal formulations should be tempered with equity. It further stated that the power of High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is discretionary, and even when an order is found to be illegal, the Court can refrain from upsetting it to ensure substantial justice.
In the present case, the appellant, who was the auction purchaser of a property mortgaged to the bank, challenged the High Court's decision. The auction took place in 2007, and the appellant had paid the full sale consideration of Rs. 24,00,000 and received the sale certificate. However, the respondent (the guarantor) challenged the auction proceedings in 2008, citing that the bank did not issue a 15-day notice for the auction. The High Court accepted this challenge and declared the auction illegal.
The Supreme Court held that the auction had been completed in 2007, and no objections had been raised until 2008. It noted that the appellant had already invested a substantial amount in the property. The Court criticized the High Court for adhering strictly to technicalities without considering the practical implications of the case. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court's judgment, reinforcing that legal actions must also consider the equitable realities of the case.
CRIMINAL LAW
Mahendra Awase v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025
The Supreme Court set aside the Madhya Pradesh High Court’s decision rejecting an appellant’s plea for discharge under Section 306 IPC (abetment of suicide). It criticized the routine misuse of the provision by police and lower courts, emphasizing that charges should not be framed mechanically without meeting the high threshold required by law.
In this case, the deceased had left a suicide note alleging harassment by the appellant over loan repayment. The trial court framed charges, and the High Court upheld the decision. However, the Supreme Court ruled that merely demanding repayment of a loan does not constitute instigation to suicide. It noted inconsistencies in the case, including a delayed FIR, and reaffirmed that a person’s conduct must directly drive the deceased to take their life. The Court discharged the appellant and urged investigating agencies and trial courts to apply Section 306 with caution, preventing its abuse.
Ramu Appa Mahapatar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025
The Supreme Court overturned the Bombay High Court’s decision upholding the life imprisonment of an accused under Section 302 IPC. The Court ruled that the extra-judicial confession, the primary basis for conviction, lacked credibility and suffered from material contradictions.
The case involved an accused allegedly confessing to killing his live-in partner with a grinding stone. However, the Court found inconsistencies in witness testimonies, the absence of forensic evidence like blood stains, and the lack of weapon recovery. It stressed that extra-judicial confessions must be voluntary, credible, and corroborated by other evidence, which was missing in this case.
The Court held that mere suspicion, even if strong, cannot replace solid proof. Finding the prosecution's case unreliable, it granted the accused the benefit of the doubt and acquitted him.
Narcotics Control Bureau v. Lakhwinder Singh, 2025
The Supreme Court clarified that a rigid rule requiring a convict to have served half of their sentence before being granted bail or suspension of sentence pending an appeal does not apply. The Court observed that while the Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) had argued that the High Court could not suspend the sentence as the convict had not served half of the 10-year sentence under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act, the Court held that relief could be granted based on the merits of the case.
The Court emphasized that the guidelines from the Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee vs. Union of India (1994), which allowed the release of prisoners who had served half their sentence, were intended as a one-time measure to address overcrowding in prisons. The Court further observed that these directions did not curtail the power of the courts to grant bail or suspend sentences in deserving cases, even if the convict had not served half of their sentence.
The bench noted that if a rigid approach were adopted, many convicts could end up serving their entire sentence before their appeal is heard, violating their constitutional rights under Article 21. In cases where an accused has served a substantial part of their sentence, and there is a delay in the appeal process, the Court can grant bail or suspend the sentence, despite the statutory constraints under Section 37 of the NDPS Act. Thus, the Court dismissed the appeal filed by the NCB and upheld the High Court's order granting suspension of sentence to the convict.
CIVIL LAW
Bhudev Mallick Alias Bhudeb Mallick v. Ranajit Ghoshal, 2025
In a recent judgment, the Supreme Court ruled that the execution of a decree granting a perpetual injunction is not subject to any period of limitation. This was based on Article 136 of the Limitation Act, which states that no limitation period applies to applications for enforcing or executing a decree for a perpetual injunction.
The Court made this observation while rejecting an argument against the execution of a decree for a permanent injunction after forty years. The bench, comprising Justice JB Pardiwala and Justice R Mahadevan, clarified that a decree for a permanent injunction becomes enforceable when the judgment debtor attempts to disturb the decree holder's peaceful possession, dispossess them, or obstruct the enjoyment of the property.
The Court further emphasized that each breach of the injunction is independent and actionable, and the judgment debtor can be held accountable for every breach. The doctrine of res judicata does not apply, and the Court is expected to take strict action against successive violations.
Om Prakash Gupta Alias Lalloowa (Now Deceased) & Ors. v. Satish Chandra (Now Deceased) & Connected Matter, 2025
The Supreme Court held that if an appeal abates due to the failure to substitute legal heirs, filing a substitution application under Order XXII Rule 4 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) negates the need for a separate application to set aside the abatement. The Court observed that even if the substitution application does not explicitly pray for setting aside the abatement, such a prayer can be inherently read into the substitution request in the interest of justice.
The bench, comprising Justices Dipankar Datta and P.K. Mishra, addressed a case where the High Court had recalled the restoration of a second appeal, asserting that a separate application to set aside the abatement was required. The Court set aside the High Court's decision, emphasizing a justice-oriented approach. It referred to the case of Mithailal Dalsangar Singh v. Annabai Devram Kini (2003), where the Court held that a prayer for substitution could be construed as a prayer to set aside the abatement.
The Supreme Court stated that allowing the prayer for substitution would implicitly set aside the abatement, thereby aligning with the principle of ensuring justice is served without unnecessary procedural hurdles. Thus, the appeal was allowed, reinforcing the flexible approach towards procedural requirements under Order XXII Rule 4 CPC.
FAMILY LAW
Sukhdev Singh v. Sukhbir Kaur, 2025
The Supreme Court clarified that permanent alimony and interim maintenance under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (HMA) can be granted even if the marriage has been declared void under Section 11 of the Act. The bench, comprising Justices Abhay S. Oka, Ahsanuddin Amanullah, and Augustine George Masih, was responding to a reference concerning conflicting decisions on whether a spouse can claim maintenance when the marriage is void.
The Court affirmed that a spouse whose marriage is declared void under Section 11 is entitled to seek permanent alimony under Section 25 of the HMA. The grant of such relief is discretionary, based on the facts of the case and the conduct of the parties. The Court also held that interim maintenance can be granted under Section 24 even if a marriage is prima facie void or voidable, as long as the conditions for interim relief are satisfied, and the court takes the conduct of the parties into consideration.
The judgment clarified that the term "any decree" under Section 25 includes a decree of nullity (declaring the marriage void) and that the legislature made no distinction between a decree of divorce and a decree of nullity. Therefore, the spouse in a void marriage can claim permanent alimony under Section 25 of the HMA. The Court answered the reference in favor of granting maintenance or alimony in such cases, thus resolving the earlier conflicts in Supreme Court decisions.
ARBITRATION
Krishna Devi v. Union of India, 2025
The Supreme Court overturned the Delhi High Court’s decision, ruling that the limitation period for filing objections against an arbitral award begins when a party becomes aware of its availability, not when they receive a formal notice.
In this case, the appellant sought judgment enforcement under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act after the respondents delayed payments for a 1987-88 construction contract. Though the award was made in May 2022, it was delayed due to unpaid arbitrator fees, finally cleared in November 2022. The District Court dismissed the appellant’s application as premature, stating the 30-day objection period had not expired since formal notice was issued on 18-11-2022.
The Supreme Court ruled that the respondents were already aware of the award’s availability by 21-09-2022, making the formal notice irrelevant. Citing previous judgments, the Court emphasized that awareness, not formal notification, triggers the limitation period. Since the objection period expired on 20-10-2022, the appellant’s application was valid. The Court directed the District Judge to expedite the case within five months.
